Is it time for robot rights? Moral status in artificial entities by Müller, VC
Vol.:(0123456789) 
Ethics and Information Technology 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10676-021-09596-w
ORIGINAL PAPER
Is it time for robot rights? Moral status in artificial entities
Vincent C. Müller1 
Accepted: 12 April 2021 
© The Author(s) 2021
Abstract
Some authors have recently suggested that it is time to consider rights for robots. These suggestions are based on the claim 
that the question of robot rights should not depend on a standard set of conditions for ‘moral status’; but instead, the question 
is to be framed in a new way, by rejecting the is/ought distinction, making a relational turn, or assuming a methodological 
behaviourism. We try to clarify these suggestions and to show their highly problematic consequences. While we find the 
suggestions ultimately unmotivated, the discussion shows that our epistemic condition with respect to the moral status of 
others does raise problems, and that the human tendency to empathise with things that do not have moral status should be 
taken seriously—we suggest that it produces a “derived moral status”. Finally, it turns out that there is typically no individual 
in real AI that could even be said to be the bearer of moral status. Overall, there is no reason to think that robot rights are 
an issue now.
Keywords AI · AMA · Artificial intelligence · Artificial moral agent · Ethical behaviourism · Ethics · Moral agent · Moral 
consideration · Moral patient · Moral status · Orchestration · Person · Relational turn · Rights · Robot
Introduction: rights, agents, patients 
and moral status
Some people in the field take the view that it should be seri-
ously considered whether robots should be allocated rights 
now (Cappuccio et al., 2020; Coeckelbergh, 2012, 2018, 
2020a; Danaher, 2020; Gunkel, 2018a, 2018b, 2020; Tavani, 
2018; Turner, 2019). To be sure, the general issue who or 
what should have rights is of crucial importance—some of 
the worst atrocities in human history were and are based on 
wrongly claiming that certain humans or other animals do 
not have rights.
Before going into the details, we must briefly establish 
the state of the art and some terminology. James Moor 
distinguished four types of machine ethical agents: ethi-
cal impact agents (example: robot jockeys), implicit ethi-
cal agents (example: safe autopilot), explicit ethical agents 
(example: using formal methods to estimate utility), and 
full ethical agents. He concludes: “A full ethical agent can 
make explicit ethical judgments and generally is competent 
to reasonably justify them. An average adult human is a full 
ethical agent. We typically regard humans as having con-
sciousness, intentionality, and free will.” (Moor, 2006: 20; 
cf. Schlosser, 2019). Of course, ‘free will’ is a heavily con-
tested notion, but it appears that the main criteria are inten-
tional agency, alternative possibilities, and causal control 
(List, 2019; Mayr, 2011). In the philosophy of mind, a ‘full 
agent’ with ‘free will’ is often called a ‘person’ (Frankfurt, 
1971) who is responsible for their actions. There is a long-
standing and important discussion about the question which 
entities in the world are such responsible agents. Problematic 
cases include children, primates, people under drug influ-
ence, mentally handicapped people, future AI, angels, fic-
tional characters, and social groups—the ‘pessimists’ think 
even typical human adults do not have such responsibility 
(Strawson, 2004).
In the discussions of robot rights, the less demanding 
notion of ‘moral patient’ plays a central role: As we saw, 
full ethical agents have rights and responsibilities while 
ethical patients only have rights, because harm to them mat-
ters. It appears that some entities are patients without being 
agents, e.g. animals that can feel pain but cannot make justi-
fied choices (Johnson & Verdicchio, 2018 says this should 
not lead us to treat robots this way). On the other hand, it is 
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generally assumed, with Kant, that moral agents or persons 
are always deserving of ‘respect’, and are thus moral patients 
as well. (This may well turn out to be problematic in the case 
of artificial moral agents.)
In this paper, we will use the term ‘has moral status’ to 
mean that an entity is a moral agent or a moral patient. (We 
do not differentiate between ‘ethical’ and ‘moral’, and we 
will not use the term ‘rights’ because this leads to further 
confusions.)
Apart from the terminology in this discussion, there are 
also authors who use the word ‘agent’ in a weaker sense, 
borrowing from the ‘software agent’ use in computer sci-
ence, where matters of responsibility or even moral status 
will not arise. A characteristic remark is: “We conclude 
that there is substantial and important scope, particularly in 
Computer Ethics, for the concept of moral agent not neces-
sarily exhibiting free will, mental states or responsibility.” 
(Floridi & Saunders, 2004: 349). In a recent survey paper 
of the computing literature, the assumption is, quite sim-
ply, “The term AMA [artificial moral agent] will be used 
throughout the paper to refer to artificial agents capable of 
making ethical and moral decisions.” (cf. Allen et al., 2000; 
Cervantes et al., 2020: 503). For the context of ‘machine 
ethics’ in AI ethics, see (Müller, 2020).
There are two issues that are mentioned (e.g. Gunkel, 
2018b: 90, 93) in the discussion of ‘rights for robots’, but 
that have no bearing at all on the issue which entities have 
moral status, so we shall ignore them in the discussion: 
(1) Should we change our legal systems such that artificial 
systems or natural objects be treated as ‘legal entities’ or 
‘legal persons’ with rights? (Bertolini & Aiello, 2018; Kurki, 
2019: ch. 6; Stone, 1972) (2) Would it be ethical to make 
artificial systems that have phenomenal consciousness and 
thus moral status? Many people have their doubts (Bent-
ley et al., 2018: 28f; Dennett, 2019; Schwitzgebel & Garza, 
2015; van Wynsberghe & Robbins, 2019; Ziesche & Yam-
polskiy, 2019). Metzinger calls this a “negative synthetic 





As explained above, the standard view is: If robots had 
some properties (especially sentience), then they would 
have moral status, but they do not have those properties 
now, so they do not have such status now. Gunkel has sug-
gested (Gunkel, 2018a, 2018b) that we should not consider 
the question whether robots do have rights, but whether 
they can and should have rights. So, we are looking at two 
statements: “Robots can have rights” and “Robots should 
have rights”, and their negations: a total of four combina-
tions. (Surprisingly, there is no temporal dimension dis-
cussed here, so we take these to cover present and future.) 
He then tries to place positions in the current debate in the 
resulting matrix:
Robots should not 
have rights
Robots should have 
rights





Robots can have 
rights
‘Slaves’; J. Bryson Properties; N. Bos-
trom, B. Goertzel; R. 
Sparrow
Out of the four theoretical options in the matrix, the two in 
the bottom row look like plausible options (can + should 
not; can + should), whereas in the top row, the first looks 
superfluous (cannot + should not), and the second contra-
dictory (cannot + should).
Some authors, such as L. Floridi and A. Winfield are 
said to defend the orthodox belief that the notion of robot 
rights is “unthinkable”, and thus to stand outside this 
matrix. Gunkel’s book on the topic (2018a) is explicitly 
staged as “a provocative attempt to think about what has 
been previously regarded as unthinkable: whether and to 
what extent robots and other technological artifacts of our 
own making can and should have any claim to moral and 
legal standing” (http:// machi neque stion. org/ robot rights/). 
But these authors do not say robot rights are ‘unthinkable’, 
they just say that current and foreseeable robots do not 
have the properties necessary for rights—not that robot 
rights are metaphysically impossible (i.e. contradictory) 
or epistemically impossible (i.e. impossible to think of). 
As Moor pointed out, “Even John Searle, a major critic of 
strong AI, doesn’t argue that machines can’t possess these 
features [of a full ethical agent].” (Moor, 2006: 21). A few 
authors have come close to such an impossibility claim, 
however, e.g. (Hakli & Mäkelä, 2019) argue that the his-
tory of robots (e.g. the fact that they are designed, and thus 
manipulated) prevents them from having responsibility.
Gunkel himself concludes, after many twists and turns, 
that the matrix does not work because the underlying 
assumption fails: There is no neat distinction between 
factual questions (Can robots have rights?) and norma-
tive questions (Should robots have rights?). He claims 
the is/ought distinction fails, and he suggests to “think 
otherwise”—thus the title of his paper (Gunkel, 2018b). 
Let us just note at this point that the difficulties with the 
matrix do not offer a reason to reject the is/ought distinc-
tion, which is a very large issue. But what is the argument, 
exactly, and what is it an argument for? C. Allen already 
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observed in his review of Gunkel’s book (Gunkel, 2012) 
that the arguments are “often hard to discern” (Allen, 
2013), so let us try a reconstruction.
Nasty reconstruction (1)
Here is an initial reconstruction of Gunkel’s point. He looks 
at the standard argument against robot rights, which runs 
something like this:
1. Robots do not fulfil the requirements → Robots do not 
have rights
2. Robots do not fulfil the requirements
3. → Robots do not have rights
A simple modus ponens, starting from a necessary condi-
tion. But what is the response supposed to be? He rejects 
the ‘properties view’ in premise 1, so is this the argument?
(A) I deny premise 1
(B) I conclude ‘not 3’: Robots do have rights
Of course, concluding the negation of the conclusion is inva-
lid, so that cannot be the point. In the best case Gunkel could 
conclude (B)’ “I demand other reasons for conclusion 3.” 
In that case, we need some support for claim (A) now. And 
what is that support for “thinking otherwise” supposed to 
be? Perhaps it is the ‘relational turn’.
The relational turn
Background: humans caring about things (I)
Before continuing with this reconstruction, we need to 
remind ourselves of a fact about the relation between humans 
and artefacts. Humans quite easily forge an emotional bond 
with things in the world, and quite easily attribute some kind 
of as-if agency to things. Just remember how you respond to 
humanoid robots like Pepper, teddy bears or a gingerbread 
man—and even to objects that you hold dear even though 
they have little resemblance to living things, such as a violin, 
house, car or pencil. They seem to have value, somehow. In 
a famous study 80 years ago, Heider & Simmel showed par-
ticipants “A motion picture which shows movements of three 
geometrical figures” [large triangle, small triangle, circle; 
see YouTube] and they found nearly all participants “inter-
preted the picture in terms of actions of animated beings, 
chiefly of persons” (Heider & Simmel, 1944: 243). This later 
lead to the ‘attribution theory’ as an account how humans 
explain the behaviour of others (Heider, 1956). These find-
ings are consonant with results from human–robot interac-
tion that Gunkel refers to, e.g. “We don’t seem to care what 
their artificial intelligences ‘know’ or ‘understand’ of the 
human moments we might ‘share’ with them … the perfor-
mance of connection seems connection enough” (Turkle, 
2012: 9). The human tendency to attribution also raises the 
ethical question for human–robot interaction (HRI) whether 
we should build robots that exploit this tendency. – We shall 
have occasion to return to this matter later.
The relational turn
The suggestion in the ‘relational turn’ is that we should 
replace the orthodox account by an account that is based 
on the relation we humans have to the artefacts in ques-
tion. This is achieved by “deliberately flipping the Humean 
script, considering not ‘how ought may be derived from is’ 
but rather ‘how is is only able to be derived from ought.’” 
(Gunkel, 2018b: 95). This is supposed to be a radicalisation 
of Emmanuel Levinas’ philosophy of encountering another 
person. In his book Growing Moral Relations, M. Coeck-
elbergh had said, programmatically: “Who is the architect, 
who constructs moral status? We humans do;” (Coeckel-
bergh, 2012: 7). In a later paper, he explains “‘moral status’ 
depends on moral status ascription and its conditions of pos-
sibility. … we should ask what kind of relations we want to 
have to them.” and “This [human] moral subject is no longer 
a perceiver or observer but a doer, who actively relates to her 
environment.” (Coeckelbergh, 2018: 197 and 208; cf. Coeck-
elbergh, 2020b: 47–62)—see also the criticism in (Gerdes, 
2016). Gunkel summarises: “Consequently, the question of 
social and moral status does not necessarily depend on what 
the other is in its essence but on […] how we decide, in ‘the 
face of the other’ […], to respond.” (Gunkel, 2018a: 97). We 
shall ignore the artful hedging with the words “social” and 
“necessarily” in that sentence.
There are several other authors who take this turn. 
(Dumouchel & Damiano, 2017) say in their book on social 
robotics, that we should think of robots as a “new social spe-
cies” (xiii) because “… the traditional conception of emo-
tions as discrete phenomena, as internal and private experi-
ences, must be abandoned, and affect must be reconceived 
as continuous mechanism of interindividual coordination.” 
(14). P. Gamez et al. propose to “investigate the ‘machine 
question’ by studying whether virtue or vice can be attrib-
uted to artificial intelligence; that is, are people willing to 
judge machines as possessing moral character?” (Gamez 
et al., 2020) (cf. Tavani, 2018). J. Bryson defines: “I intend 
to use … moral patient to mean “something a society deems 
itself responsible for preserving the wellbeing of,” (Bryson, 
2018: 16) and then she continues: “Human … moral systems 
… already attribute patiency to artefacts such as particular 
books, flags, or concepts” (Bryson, 2018: 16; cf. Wareham, 
2020).
The idea that humans actively make things important was 
an important point that classical existentialism had stressed 
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already (Camus, 1942). Here, our human making this is 
taken to say we decide on what relations we want to have 
to “them”, and this makes the moral status. If we decide to 
respond to something as a moral patient, then we make it 
into a patient, then it is a patient.
Nasty reconstruction (2)
Let us try a reconstruction of the argumentative structure 
here. For instances of “how we decide to respond” etc. that 
imply or generate moral patiency, we shall say “feel respon-
sibility towards”. So here is the argument:
1. I feel responsibility towards x → x has moral status
2. I feel responsibility towards robots
3. → Robots have moral status
This argument is valid (modus ponens) and premise 2 is 
often empirically true—as we indicated above, with attribu-
tion theory. But it is tempting to try a reductio ad absurdum 
by replacing premise 2 with another empirically true propo-
sition: It so happens that I like nice pencils and I expect 
myself and others to treat them with care and respect. In 
other words, I feel responsibility towards pencils. So, here 
is vs. 2 of the argument:
1. I feel responsibility towards x → x has moral status
2. I feel responsibility towards pencils
3. → Pencils have moral status
This conclusion is pretty close to absurd. Premise 1, the 
core of the relational turn, is a version of anything goes that 
dissolves the question of moral patiency to a random act of 
will. Anything I happen to care about receives moral status. 
Indeed, I want you to respect my pencils, but should it follow 
that pencils have moral status? We shall return to other solu-
tions below, under the heading of “derived moral status”.
The absurdity remains if the “I” above is expanded to a 
“we”, e.g. a society of pencil-worshippers. We, the members 
of that society can demand from the others that they should 
treat our pencils and customs with respect, but not that they 
should conclude that pencils have moral status, after all. 
(Just like you would not conclude that red-haired women 
lack moral status because some society thinks so.)
These consequences also remain if we add a little more 
caution than the “random” act of will:
1. I feel responsibility towards x and I want to feel 
responsibility towards x, upon reflection → x has 
moral status
Here we turned premise 1. into a  2nd order desire based on 
rational reflection, which is said to have the power to gener-
ate or to take away moral status.
We were not told, but the relational turn is a relativist 
account of moral status, with all the problems that come 
with that: no possibility to be right or wrong (to “respond” 
in the right or wrong way), no possibility of better or worse 
views, no possibility of moral progress, the ability to find out 
about moral status by just looking up what we/I made, etc. 
Anything goes now, including some conclusions that we now 
regard as sad low points in human moral history.
This is heavy baggage. Also, it weakens the proposal 
since standard moral relativism cannot criticise someone 
who replies “robots have no moral status for me/us”. Per-
haps it would be useful if the proponents of this theory could 
locate it in the standard landscape of relativism and anti-
realism, both epistemologically and metaphysically. Are they 
perhaps of the meta-ethical view that declarative sentences 
about moral status (like “This robot is a moral patient.”) 




J. Danaher has suggested that for moral status ascription, we 
should neither rely on specific criteria for inner properties, 
nor on our tendency to respond (as in the relational turn), but 
rather on observable performance. He proposes:
(1) If a robot is roughly performatively equivalent to 
another entity whom [sic], it is widely agreed, has 
significant moral status, then it is right and proper to 
afford the robot that same status.
(2) Robots can be roughly performatively equivalent to 
other entities whom, it is widely agreed, have signifi-
cant moral status.
(3) Therefore, it can be right and proper to afford robots 
significant moral status. (Danaher, 2020: 2026)
This is presented as a version of methodological behaviour-
ism, not ontological behaviourism, so it avoids an onto-
logical thesis about what there is; instead it states what we 
should talk about in proper scientific method. To support 
premise (1), Danaher suggests a general view of ‘ethical 
behaviourism’, which “is the ethical equivalent of the Turing 
Test” (Danaher, 2020: 2028). The ‘behaviour’ here is said 
to include “measurable behaviour and brain phenomena, not 
inner mental states” (Danaher, 2020: 2028). In his conclu-
sion, Danaher says: “If a robot looks and acts like a being 
to whom summarises moral status is afforded then it should 
be afforded the same moral status, irrespective of what it is 
made from or how it was designed/manufactured.” (Danaher, 
2020: 2047). So, if it walks like a duck, swims like a duck 
and quacks like a duck, it has the moral status of a duck!
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This is a somewhat puzzling proposal, since we thought 
that behaviourism is dead … since its demise in the 1970ies 
when we realised that a) it does not capture what we mean 
by our mental terms, and b) it does not capture what we can 
do in cognitive science. Why drag it out from the graveyard?
Perhaps the solution to this puzzle is that the proposal 
is not quite behaviourism, and it is not quite about moral 
status, either: It does allow an investigation of ‘inner states’ 
(“brain phenomena”), and that sounds much more like stand-
ard cognitive science. States of the brain are not normally 
called ‘behaviour’ and looking into that ‘black box’ was 
specifically outlawed in the behaviourist programme. Of 
course, a cognitive scientist would use terms that can be 
grounded in scientific findings, not in folk psychology—and 
they would have to speak from a  3rd person perspective, but 
they would look at brain data and interpret that in terms of 
a functional, psychological, description, not just a descrip-
tion of the physical substrate. Danaher explains: “Ethical 
behaviourism states that a sufficient epistemic ground or 
warrant for believing that we have duties and responsibili-
ties toward other entities (or that they have rights against us) 
can be found in their observable behavioural relations and 
reactions to us (and to the world around them).” (Danaher, 
2020: 2028).
Yes, but the questions what we have sufficient ground to 
believe and what is the case are different questions. Even if 
I have sufficient ground to believe that an entity with a par-
ticular behaviour has moral status, it may still turn out that 
this entity does not in fact have moral status (similar points 
are made in (Nyholm, 2020, ch. 8.2). What causes ground 
or belief that something is a duck may be quite irrelevant to 
its moral status. An artefact like a robot may even be specifi-
cally designed to make us believe that it has moral status. 
So, it may walk like a duck, swim like a duck and quack 
like a duck, but not be a duck—and should not enjoy the 
moral status of a duck (which happens to be that or a moral 
patient). The initial argument set out above talks about what 
we should “afford” the robot, which is even more cautious—
perhaps that means what we should ‘provide it with’? In that 
case, robots do not have moral status, but we give it to them. 
Do we have such powers?
Nasty reconstruction (3)
Danaher comes to the same conclusion as the supporters of a 
‘relational turn’ by taking ‘what we normally attribute moral 
status to’ as the criterion.
Of course, this works. We might take a statement like 
this:
(R) People believe that robots have moral status → 
robots have moral status
For ‘believe’ set your preferred version, e.g. ‘behave as if’, 
‘afford’, ‘relate to as if’, ‘normally attribute’. If one accepts 
a statement like (R), then the issue of moral status becomes 
a matter of our beliefs for any entity. This is especially true 
if we turn (R) into a biconditional:
(RR) People believe that robots have moral status ↔ 
robots have moral status
It is hard to see how someone might accept (R) but not (RR) 
because that would be to say that our belief can make robots 
gain moral status, but it cannot take away moral status from 
robots. As we saw above, anything goes if we accept that 
kind of statement.
There seems to be no issue of robot rights, just an issue 
of being tempted by versions of moral relativism. Why go 
down that road?
Diagnosis
Our All‑Too human epistemic situation
Let us backtrack a bit and see whether there is some fire to 
all that smoke. Many of the points made in favour of the 
issue go back to our epistemic condition when we talk about 
moral status in entities other than ourselves. The criteria 
used in traditional accounts of moral status use features like 
phenomenal consciousness, free will and other mental states; 
and these have an especially problematic epistemic position. 
Danaher says: “The ethical behaviourist points out that our 
ability to ascertain the existence of each and every one of 
these metaphysical properties is ultimately dependent on 
some inference from a set of behavioural representations.” 
(Danaher, 2020: 2029)—leaving out what we may know 
about inner workings or functional role. (Shevlin forthcom-
ing) also comes to this conclusion, on the epistemic question 
alone. (Agar, 2019) says, more cautiously, there is an issue 
of how we should treat “machines that might have minds”.
This is on the background of the traditional view that 
one’s own experience is in principle inaccessible to other 
humans and the corresponding “other minds problem”. The 
eminent philosopher of mind Thomas Nagel expresses the 
mainstream view when he says: “The only experiences you 
can actually have are your own: if you believe anything about 
the mental lives of others, it is on the basis of observing their 
physical construction and behavior.”; “… your experience 
of tasting chocolate is locked inside your mind in a way that 
makes it unobservable to anyone else – even if he opens 
up your skull and looks inside the brain.” Nagel concludes: 
“There seem to be two very different kinds of things going 
on in the world: the things that belong to physical reality, 
which many different people can observe from the outside, 
and those other things that belong to mental reality, which 
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each of us experiences from the inside in his own case.” (cf. 
Nagel, 1974: 435; Nagel, 1987: 20f, 29f, 36).
This kind of discussion is surely in the back of our minds 
when we try to find ways to attribute moral status. This is 
not the place to go deeper these issues, but let it be taken 
as a given that we do not have a proper scientific method to 
test for the existence of phenomenal consciousness or free 
will—even if we assume that these are sensible concepts and 
that humans ‘normally’ have these features.
But what are we to conclude from such a situation? Does 
it follow that anything goes, in the style of principle RR), 
above? As we say, it would not help, anyway: If we humans 
can do as we please, I may attribute moral status while you 
do not (or we might, while they do not). Or does it follow 
from the epistemic situation that we should assume some 
wide precautionary principle, such as: “We cannot be abso-
lutely certain that trees have no sentience, thus it is better 
to assume that they have sentience and treat them accord-
ingly?” Surely not.
The real discussion is what we can know from behaviour 
and inner structure, and what is the best scientific theory 
that we can generate from that. The extended discussions 
about sentience in animals have some examples that are rel-
evant to ours, e.g. “can fish feel pain?” (Allen & Trestman, 
2017) or what are the conditions for artificial consciousness, 
e.g. (Seth, 2018) or in the Journal of Artificial Intelligence 
and Consciousness. This is analogous to the question what 
would be required to have a robot to feel pain, to mean what 
it says or to have ‘machine consciousness’. These are real 
issues and we know what the methods for investigation are: 
They will involve conceptual clarification, theoretical mod-
els and scientific causal explanations that use behaviour and 
inner structure—but they do not include “how I decide to 
respond”.
Note that we do not claim to have made a general case 
against moral status of robots, quite the contrary: We just 
tried to work out the assumptions in the proposals for attrib-
uting moral status to them right now—and find these prob-
lematic. One should attribute moral status to robots when 
they fulfil the criteria. This strikes us as less ‘speciecist’ 
than proposals that their moral status depends on ‘how 
we humans decide to respond to them [sic!]’ or ‘what we 
humans decide to afford to them, given how they perform’. 
This is not to say that there are not other properties that may 
be response-dependent in a sense that can be explained (cf. 
Wheeler, 2020).
Last but not least, it is good to keep in mind that the cri-
teria for moral status admit to a degree of vagueness, so we 
should not expect the set of ‘objects with moral status’ to 
have a sharp border (e. g. very young humans are not moral 
agents, but they can gradually grow to be agents). But even 
without sharp borders, there are objects that clearly fall into 
that set, and objects that do not.
Humans caring about things (II)—derived moral status
We said above that it seems absurd to claim moral status 
for pencils, but there is a bit more to this issue. It really 
would not be nice of you to step on my pencil, my teddy 
bear, the flag of my favourite football club or my religious 
symbol. These objects deserve what we might call ‘con-
sideration’, meaning that behaviour towards them can be 
judged as morally right or wrong. Is that because they 
have moral status as moral patients? No. It is because I 
have moral status and thus deserve consideration. Doing 
something to these objects does something morally rel-
evant to me. This would apply particularly to an object 
that represents me, in some way (e.g. my avatar) or have 
a special symbolic social role. If we want, we might call 
this a ‘moral status’ of objects, but this is only a derived 
moral status—rather like Searle’s ‘derived intentional-
ity’ of symbols (Searle, 2004: 19f) and ‘derived value’ 
of social constructs like money (Searle, 1995: 31ff). Ph. 
Brey had already suggested 13 years ago (against Floridi 
& Saunders) that “many (but not all) inanimate things in 
the world deserve moral respect, not because of intrinsic 
value, but because of their (potential) extrinsic, instrumen-
tal or emotional value for persons.” (Brey, 2008: 109). M. 
Coeckelbergh also seems to take this line into account, 
recently (Coeckelbergh, 2020c).
It has been pointed out many times that artefacts like 
robots are more than just tools; they mediate between the 
user and the world. This has led some authors to propose 
an extension of moral agency to technological artefacts (a 
survey in Noorman, 2020). The outcome of these discus-
sions appears to be just a conceptual clarification of ‘moral 
agent’, however.
Further to the consideration for objects, we will also 
often make judgments about people on the basis of their 
behaviour towards objects, even if these objects do not 
‘deserve consideration’. Deliberately stepping on someone 
else’s teddy bear is problematic (a lack of respect for the 
other person), but so is stepping on one’s own teddy bear 
(it shows a lack of self-respect). But even if there are no 
other persons involved at all, if there is no derived moral 
status, we tend to judge people’s behaviour, and we might 
even assume that behaviour towards objects without moral 
status influences behaviour towards entities with moral sta-
tus, e.g. animals or humans. So, there is a real question 
of how we should behave towards objects without moral 
status, including robots; perhaps sex robots are a good 
example of this (Nyholm, 2020, ch. 2; Whitby, 2008). As 
Dumouchel and Damiano rightly say, “how we live with 
robots … reflects our own moral character” (2017: xiv)—
though surely this is not a reason to treat robots as moral 
patients, either (pace Cappuccio et al. 2020).
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Beyond agency: orchestration
As an outlook to where the case of AI might lead us, we 
would suggest looking at some work on embodied cognition. 
Work on the notion that the morphology of the body ‘com-
putes’ cognitive properties found that the dynamic orchestra-
tion of behaviour involves a complex interaction of compu-
tational and morphological features. In an earlier paper, we 
had asked “Perhaps we should abandon the old image of the 
central control in computers, but also in humans?” (Müller, 
2007: 112) and later we concluded: “The question for robot 
design and cognitive science is not whether computation 
is offloaded to the body, but to what extent the body facili-
tates cognition and control—how it contributes to the overall 
orchestration of intelligent behavior.” (Müller & Hoffmann, 
2017: 1). In that view, intelligent behaviour is less the result 
of an agent acting in some way, but of a complex interaction 
of body, physical environment, social environment, cogni-
tion and interaction over time.
So, even in the design of robots, individuated agency 
plays a minor role; what matters is the orchestration of intel-
ligent behaviour in a context. Of course, this is not to claim 
that there is no agency in the natural world, but rather that 
the aim in current AI technology is to produce a system that 
works, not an artificially intelligent individual. Whether the 
traditional and often metaphorical talk about ‘agents’ is still 
useful is debated in AI, quite independently from the accept-
ance or rejection of an embodied approach (Dignum & Dig-
num, 2020). That debate is worth continuing (in a different 
paper). Note how the talk about ‘robot rights’ glosses over 
the fact that artificial systems often have no particular body, 
or any other ‘identity’ or ‘self’ that could be said to ‘have’ 
a moral status. Criteria for identity are easier to come by 
for physical robots than for most AI systems. The question 
of moral status of agents and patients in AI may not even 
present itself now. It looks like a fiction for philosophers.
Conclusions
We started our hermeneutic circle on robot rights from 
“Introduction: Rights, Agents, Patients and Moral Status” 
the orthodox account of necessary conditions for moral 
status and then looked at “Thinking Otherwise” and “The 
Relational Turn”, and an attempt “Danaher’s “Behaviorism” 
to revive behaviourism, all of which ended up in the same 
relativist impasse. We suggested “Diagnosis” to return to 
the orthodox account, but to take home some lessons from 
this discussion:
(a) Humans tend to empathise with various things in the 
world, especially those that remind us of natural agents
(b) Our epistemic status with respect to ‘other minds’ is a 
problem in allocating moral status
(c) There are objects that do not have moral status but 
deserve consideration due to their relation with an 
agent/patient; they have a derived moral status
(d) Allowing (non-derived) moral status to be depend-
ent on a human decision or attitude is philosophically 
unfounded and dangerous
(e) How humans behave towards objects that do not have 
moral status can be relevant for how we judge those 
humans
(f) Present AI does not aim for individual agents or patients 
but rather for orchestration of intelligent behaviour in a 
context
So, the attempts to re-define the issue of moral status for 
robots or AI systems made very substantial philosophical 
assumptions, but despite these they fail in their attempt to 
establish that ‘robot rights’ are an issue that is relevant for 
current or near-term systems. The question whether present-
day robots have moral status is settled: They do not. But 
the discussion raises interesting issues about epistemology, 
about what human behaviour towards robots says about us 
humans, and about our all-too-human tendency to see indi-
viduals with moral status everywhere.
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